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Abstract
Istanbul Byzantine Fault Tolerance (IBFT) is a proof-of-authority (PoA) blockchain consensus
protocol that ensures immediate finality. A formal model of IBFT is presented, and the correct-
ness of IBFT is analysed. We show that the protocol does not guarantee Byzantine-fault-tolerant
persistence when operating on an eventually synchronous network. We also show that the protocol
does not guarantee Byzantine-fault-tolerant liveness when operating on an eventually synchronous
network. Modifications are proposed to the protocol to ensure both Byzantine-fault-tolerant per-
sistence and liveness in eventually synchronous settings.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Blockchains, also known as distributed transaction ledgers, are immutable, append-only data structures
that maintain an ordered set of transactions organised into blocks whose order is established crypto-
graphically. Such structures are therefore tamper evident in that modification of either a block or the
order of blocks may be readily determined at runtime. A blockchain starts with an initial block called
the genesis block. The first widely adopted blockchains were Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2].
The Ethereum blockchain augments the standard value transfer capability of each transaction with
the possibility to specify instructions of a Turing-complete language to execute on a sandboxed run-
time. The runtime, called the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) modifies the Ethereum global state
maintained by each node [2]. This means that any user of the Ethereum blockchain has the capability
to create decentralised applications, called smart contracts, that can govern the interaction between
the different users of the system. One of the first use cases for Ethereum was the creation of escrow
smart contracts eliminating the need for a trusted 3rd party.
Within the blockchain context, the role of consensus protocols is to define algorithms by which all nodes
on the network can agree on the canonical block sequence. Most of these protocols have some level
of Byzantine-fault-tolerance (BFT) [3] which means that the protocols can cope with some fraction of
the nodes, called Byzantine nodes, being faulty and behaving in any arbitrary way, including colluding
and delaying message delivery to honest nodes. The standard Ethereum consensus protocol is designed
to operate in a permissionless setting where any node can join or leave the network at any point in
time and can propose blocks to be added to the blockchain. Ethereum requires each node to spend
compute effort in resolving a hard cryptographic puzzle before it can propose a block. This type of
technique, called proof of work (PoW) [4, 1], is used to prevent Sybil attacks where a node is able to
gain power in a system by creating multiple pseudonymous identities [5]. Proof of stake (PoS) [6], proof
of space (PoSpace) [7] and proof of elapsed time (PoET) [8] are examples of alternative techniques
for preventing Sybil attacks in a permissionless context that have been proposed over the years. The
Ethereum PoW consensus protocol only guarantees probabilistic immutability of the blockchain where
the probability that a block will never be removed from the blockchain increases as new blocks are
added to the blockchain.
The IBFT consensus protocol was developed around early 2017 by AMIS [9], and has been implemented
in Quorum [10]. IBFT was created to provide an alternative consensus protocol for the Ethereum
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blockchain that was better suited for either private or consortium blockchains, where deterministic
immutability of the blockchain is often a requirement and spending significant computational effort is
less desirable. Specifically, IBFT guarantees immediate finality, i.e. each block added to the blockchain
will never be removed from it (except if the number of Byzantine actors exceed a given threshold), and
uses proof of authority (PoA) as a Sybil attack prevention technique. In PoA systems, nodes are not
required to spend compute effort to solve a cryptographic puzzle as only a set of special nodes, called
validators, are authorised to propose new blocks.
IBFT specifies minimal modifications to the standard Ethereum block header structure and block
validation ruleset while maintaining all other Ethereum capabilities (e.g. smart contracts). An IBFT
blockchain maintained by each node is constituted of finalised blocks where each finalised block contains
an Ethereum block and a finalisation proof used to attest that consensus was reached on the Ethereum
block included in the finalised block.
IBFT adapts the state machine replication protocol, Practical BFT (PBFT) [11], to work in a block-
chain setting and integrates it with the dynamic validator set voting mechanism originally designed
for Clique [12] that allows validators to be added to, or removed from, the set. This makes IBFT well
suited for consortium or private blockchains where there are limitations on which nodes can join the
network and the permissioning level of each of the nodes. Private blockchains are defined by allowing
only nodes from a single organisation to join a peer-to-peer network. A consortium network, by con-
trast, is defined by a group of organisations that form a consortium, thus nodes from any member of
the consortium can join such a network. In some consortium networks read access is made available
to the public. In both private and consortium networks block creation is limited to a subset of nodes.
To date, Kaleido, a blockchain project that offers blockchain-as-a-service, has deployed the IBFT
protocol on approximately 470 blockchain networks1. Given that Kaleido is only one of the 19 projects
offering blockchain-as-a-service [13], it is likely that the actual number of blockchain networks currently
using IBFT far exceeds this number.
1.2 Related Work
While IBFT is inspired by PBFT [11], there are a few significant differences between the two protocols:
• in IBFT there is no client submitting requests to the network, instead all of the validators can
in turn propose a block to the network of validators;
• IBFT allows for two types of nodes: validators that take part in the consensus protocol and
standard nodes that validate blocks but do not participate in the consensus protocol;
• the set of validators in PBFT is static whereas IBFT features a dynamic validator-set where
validators can be added to, or removed from, the set;
• IBFT specifies a simplified version of the so called View-Change message of PBFT and does not
include the so called New-View message included in the PBFT protocol;
• while IBFT does not use checkpoints explicitly, each IBFT block can be considered the IBFT
equivalent of a PBFT checkpoint.
PoA consensus protocols such as Clique [12], and two Aura protocols that share the same name but
are different protocols [14, 15, 16], do not guarantee immediate finality, i.e. there is no deterministic
guarantee that the blockchain history will not be rewritten. The key difference between Clique and
the two Aura protocols is the fork choice rule that decides which is the preferred chain when there are
two competing chains of blocks. Also, Ekparinya et al. [14] demonstrated that these protocols provide
only limited tolerance to Byzantine actors.
Honey Badger [17] is an example of a PoA blockchain consensus protocol that ensures immediate
finality, but relies on a probabilistic common coin protocol to ensure liveness. Therefore, the addition
of new blocks to the local blockchain of honest nodes is a probability function. This makes Honey
Badger better suited to asynchronous networks than networks that can guarantee partial synchrony.
DBFT (Democratic BFT) [18] is an example of a PoA blockchain consensus protocol that ensures
optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant resilience under the assumption that the network is reliable, i.e. all
messages that are sent are always eventually delivered. For the best case scenario, DBFT requires
4 message delays to decide on the creation of a new block. Compared to other BFT protocols, that
1Data provided by Kaleido in a private conversation.
2
usually rely on a coordinator or block proposer to ensure liveness, DBFT uses the notion of a weak-
coordinator where nodes are not necessarily required to wait for the message sent by the coordinator
in order to proceed. This is advantageous when the coordinator network is likely to experience delays
in the delivery of messages to the other nodes.
Algorand [19] is another example of a PoA blockchain consensus protocol that ensures optimal Byzantine-
fault-tolerant persistence and relies on the assumption that the network is reliable. An important
contribution of Algorand [20] is the definition of “secret cryptography sortition” where the block pro-
poser is not revealed to the network until the block is broadcast. Therefore, the risk of an adversarial
targeted attack on the proposer is reduced.
1.3 Contributions
This work presents two major contributions.
1. We improve upon the IBFT protocol definition provided by Saltini [21] by using a more precise
semantics and better specifying the process structure for each node by means of process-algebra-
like notation [22, 23, 24]. We provide a formal specifications of the protocol in process algebra-like
syntax. The immediate advantage of this notation is an unambiguous definition of the protocol
which enables us to perform a rigorous analysis of the robustness of the protocol. This will also
allow future refinement works and it provides a precise specification as starting point for other
researchers who want to explore other aspect of the protocol such as performances.
2. We also improve upon the analysis of IBFT protocol performed by Saltini [21] which is limited
to analysing the liveness property only, leaving the persistence analysis for future work.
In this paper we intend to address this knowledge gap by performing the first robustness analysis
of the IBFT protocol when operating in an eventually synchronous network [25]. As a result
of this analysis, we show that the IBFT protocol does not guarantee Byzantine-fault-tolerance
persistence and liveness when operating in an eventually synchronous network. The results
presented here provide an opportunity to put additional measures in place for old and new
deployments of IBFT networks so that the likelihood of persistence and liveness issues is reduced.
An example of such a measure is deploying nodes on a network that can guarantee a high level
of synchrony.
3. As part of this work we describe in detail how the IBFT protocol can be modified to guaran-
tee optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence. We also describe two high-level solutions for
addressing the lack of Byzantine-fault-tolerant liveness. The performance of each solution is de-
pendent on each specific use case of the blockchain network where the protocol is deployed. This
could potentially lead to the development of a configurable protocol so that users can choose
which of the two solutions is best suited to their specific needs.
Moreover, one of the two solutions to the liveness limitation (the PBFT-like solution) leads to
a blockchain consensus protocol that provides optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance persistence and
liveness even when operating on networks that may experience an initial period of asynchrony,
where messages sent during this period may be lost. This compares to the many blockchain
consensus protocols currently available (see Section 1.2) that guarantee liveness only for networks
where the eventual delivery of all messages is guaranteed. Furthermore, we argue that the
PBFT-like solution also allows for an additional optimisation to reduce the minimum number of
communication phases from 3 down to 2.
1.4 Paper Outline
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we present our analysis model, and define robustness
for the IBFT protocol as the logical conjunction of two properties: persistence and liveness. Persis-
tence guarantees blockchain consistency and immutability amongst all honest nodes, while liveness
guarantees that transactions submitted to the system will eventually be included in the blockchain
(distributed transaction ledger). In Section 3 we describe the IBFT protocol. Section 4 introduces
a series of definitions that will be used in the following analysis of the IBFT protocol. In Section 5
we present the persistence analysis of the IBFT protocol which shows that IBFT does not guarantee
Byzantine fault tolerance when operating in an eventually synchronous network. In Section 6, we
then describe and analyse modifications to the IBFT protocol that will ensure optimal Byzantine fault
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tolerance under eventual synchrony. Section 7 discusses the liveness property of the protocol showing
that IBFT is not live in eventually synchronous networks, and explores two potential modifications to
the IBFT protocol that will ensure liveness under these conditions.
2 System Model
Asynchronous nodes We consider a system composed of an unbounded number of asynchronous
nodes, each of them maintaining a local copy of the blockchain obtained by adding blocks to it as
specified by the IBFT protocol. We assume that all nodes have the same genesis block.
Network Model The IBFT protocol relies on the Ethereum ÐΞVp2p protocol for the delivery of
all protocol messages. We model the gossip network as an eventually synchronous network, also called
a partially synchronous network, as defined in Dwork et al [25], where there exists a point in time
called global stabilisation time (GST), after which the message delay is bounded by a constant, ∆.
Before GST there is no bound on the message delay. In other words, we assume that before GST
messages may be lost and never delivered, even after GST. However, once GST is reached, messages
are guaranteed to be delivered within ∆. The value of ∆ is however unknown.
Failure Model We consider a Byzantine failure mode system, where Byzantine nodes can behave
arbitrarily. In contrast, honest nodes never diverge from the protocol definition. We denote the
maximum number of Byzantine nodes that an eventually synchronous network of n nodes can be
tolerant to with f(n). As proven in Dwork et al [25], the relationship between the total number of
nodes, n, and the maximum number of Byzantine nodes can be expressed as follows:
f(n) ≡
⌊
n− 1
3
⌋
(1)
Cryptographic Primitives The IBFT protocol uses the Keccak hash function variant as per the
Ethereum Yellow Paper [2] to produce digests of blocks. We assume that the Keccak hash function is
collision-resistant.
The IBFT protocol uses the standard Ethereum ECDSA signing algorithm [2]. We assume that such
a digital signature scheme ensures uniqueness and unforgeability. Uniqueness means that the signa-
tures generated for two different messages are also different with high probability. The unforgeability
property ensures that Byzantine nodes, even if they collude, cannot forge digital signatures produced
by honest nodes.
We use 〈m〉σv to denote a message m signed by validator v.
IBFT Robustness Property For the purpose of defining the robustness property, we consider the
IBFT protocol as implementing a distributed permissioned transaction ledger with immediate finality.
A distributed transaction ledger maintains an append-only fully-ordered set of transactions and en-
sures its consistency amongst all honest nodes that participate in the protocol.
Each node maintains a local copy of the transaction ledger organised as a chain of blocks, or blockchain.
Our definition of robustness for the IBFT protocol is based on the definition of robustness for public
transaction ledgers provided in Garay et al [26].
For the purpose of this definition, the position of a transaction within the transaction ledger imple-
mented by the IBFT protocol is defined as a pair with the first component corresponding to the height
of the block including the transaction and the second component corresponding to the position of the
transaction within the block.
Definition 1. The IBFT protocol implements a robust distributed permissioned transaction ledger
with immediate finality and t-Byzantine-fault-tolerance if, provided that no more than t validators are
Byzantine, it guarantees the following two properties:
• Persistence. If an honest node adds transaction T in position i of its local transaction ledger,
then (i) T is the only transaction that can ever be added in position i by any other honest node,
(ii) T will eventually be added to the local transaction ledger of any other honest node.
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• Liveness. Provided that a transaction is submitted to all honest validators, then the transaction
will eventually be included in the distributed permissioned transaction ledger.
3 IBFT Protocol Specification
The presentation of the IBFT protocol provided in this section is based on EIP 650 [9] and the actual
implementation available on GitHub [10].
3.1 Overview
In alignment with the blockchain literature, we define the height of a finalised block FB as the distance
in finalised blocks between FB and the genesis block that has height 0. The first finalised block after
the genesis block has height 1, the next one has height 2 and so on.
For each block height, the IBFT consensus protocol can be considered running sequential different
instances of what we call the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol. The aim of the h-th instance of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol is to decide on the block to be added at height h, generate the related
finalised block and broadcast it to all nodes. Only a subset of the entire set of IBFT nodes can
participate in the h-th instance of the block finalisation protocol. We call this set of nodes the validators
for height/instance h and refer to each member of this set as a validator for height/instance h. We
also refer to all of the nodes not included in the validator set for height/instance h as standard nodes.
We often omit for height/instance h when this is clear from the context. The set of validators for each
instance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol is deterministically computed as a function of the
chain of blocks from the genesis block until the block with height h− 1.
Once the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for an honest validator reaches a decision on the block to be
included in the finalisation block with height h, it creates a finalised block by adding the finalisation
proof to the block and propagates the finalised block to all other nodes in the network, both validators
and standard nodes. Finalised blocks are transmitted using the standard Ethereum block synching
protocol by which each validator (i) transmits a newly created finalised block using the ÐΞVp2p gossip
protocol [27] and (ii) asks its peers for the availability of new finalised blocks either when the validator
starts or when the validator receives a finalised block with a height higher than the next expected
finalised block height. The purpose of the finalisation proof is to allow any node, even nodes that did
not participate in the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, to verify that a decision on the block inclusion
in the blockchain at height h was reached by a correct execution of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol
despite the presence of a potential number of Byzantine validators. As described in Section 3.5, the
finalisation proof is composed of signatures over the Ethereum block, called commit seals, that are sent
by validators as part of the Commit messages exchanged during the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
3.2 System Specification
Each node v runs the IBFT(v) protocol as defined by the following process-algebra-like [22, 23, 24]
recursive equations
IBFT (v) ≡ ibftInit(v) · ibftExecution(v) (2)
ibftExecution(v) ≡
(
igc1(v) + igc2(v)
)
· ibftExecution(v) (3)
where · indicates sequential composition, + indicates non-deterministic choice, and ibftInit(v) and(
igci(v)
)
i∈{1,2}
correspond to sequential atomic steps defined by the pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
When either line 13 or line 23 of Algorithm 1 is executed, node v starts a new
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v) process which is run in parallel to the IBFT(v) process. The
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process is described by the following process-algebra-like equa-
tions in which we use the same notation used in the definition of IBFT(v)
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IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) ≡ fpInit(h, v) · fpExecution(h, v) (4)
fpExecution(h, v) ≡
( 7
+
i=1
fpgci(h, v)
)
· fpExecution(h, v) (5)
where fpInit(h, v) and
(
fpgci(hv)
)
i∈{1,...,7}
are atomic sequential steps defined in Algorithms 2 to 4.
The process IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v) is stopped when line 19 of Algorithm 1 is executed.
Starting process IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) corresponds to starting the h-th instance of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for node v.
3.3 Notation
The notation used in the pseudocode in Algorithms 1 to 4 is as follows:
• c→ S corresponds to a guarded command where the code S can be executed only if condition c
is true;
• The scope of variables used in the guards of guarded commands extends to the pseudocode
specifying the command;
• If the domain of existential quantifiers on variables is not specified, then it is assumed to corre-
spond to the expected domain of the function argument, message or tuple component where the
variables are used;
• For brevity of notation, existential quantifiers applied to messages or tuples correspond to the
application of existential quantifiers to each of the elements of the message or tuple that is not
already assigned to a bounded variable. For example, ∃〈x, y, hv, z〉 ∈ V , where hv is the only
bounded variable already defined elsewhere, is an abbreviation for ∃x, y, z : 〈x, y, hv, z〉 ∈ V ;
• All functions in typewriter font are defined in the remainder of this section, whereas all func-
tions in italic font are defined in the pseudocode;
• {F (m) | m ∈ V ∧ P (m)} corresponds to the set obtained by applying the function F to all the
elements of V for which predicate P is true; when F (·) corresponds to the projection onto the
j-th coordinate pij(·), then we omit it, e.g. we write {x | (x, y) ∈ V } rather than {pi1(t) | t ∈ V };
• multicastv m to V corresponds to node v multicasting message m to all nodes in set V ; The
delivery of messages to the recipients happens according to the eventually synchronous network
model as detailed by the Network Model definition in Section 2;
• When a node v receives a message m, it assigns a unique identifier id to it and places the tuple
(m, id) into the set IRMv;
• RMv corresponds to the set of all messages received by node v without the identification value;
In other words, RMv is the projection of IRM v onto the first coordinate, i.e. RMv ≡ {m |
(m, id) ∈ TRMv}
• P(RMv) corresponds to the power set of RMv;
• For clarity of notation, we use sizeOf(M) to indicate the size of the set M , i.e sizeOf(M) ≡
‖M‖;
• The symbol ∗ denotes any value;
• blockHeight(FB) is defined as the height of the finalised block FB ;
• Each validator v stores its local blockchain in chainv;
• chainv[n] corresponds to the finalised block with height n, while chainv[n : m] corresponds to a
sub-chain including all of the finalised blocks from height n to height m;
• validators(chainv[0 : h − 1]) represents the set of authorised validators for instance h of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol. The definition of the validators(·) function is not presented
here as it is outside the scope of this work and does not have any relevance to the results presented
here. For the same reason, we do not describe the protocol that can be used to add or remove
validators to/from the validator set of each instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol;
• n(chainv[0 : h− 1]) represents the number of validators for instance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol, i.e. n(chainv[0 : h− 1]) ≡ sizeOf(validators(chainv[0 : h− 1]));
• finalisationProof(FB) denotes the finalisation proof included in the finalised block FB ;
• wellFormedToAddFinalProof(B) is defined as true if block B allows adding the finalisation
proof to it; it is defined to be false otherwise;
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Algorithm 1: Sequential steps of the IBFT(v) process.
1: Functions:
2: Quorum(n)≡ f(n) · 2 + 1
3: isV alidF inalisationProof(FB , v)≡
4: sizeOf({cs ∈ finalisationProof(FB) |
recValidator(KEC(block(FB)), cs) ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1])}
) ≥ Quorum(n(chainv[0 : hv − 1]))
5: isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB , v)≡
6: isV alidF inalisationProof(FB , v) ∧
isValidBlock(block(FB), block(chainv[hv − 1]))
7: Initialisation:
8: ibftInit(v)≡
9: chainv[0] ← genesis block
10: hv ← 1
11: oldPrePrepareMessagesAlreadyProcessedv ← {}
12: if v ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then
13: start IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v)
14: end
15: Guarded Commands:
16: igc1(v) ≡(
∃〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB〉 ∈ RMv :
blockHeight(block(FB)) = hv ∧
isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB , v))
→
17: chainv[hv] ← FB
18: if v ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then
19: stop IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v)
20: end
21: hv ← hv + 1
22: if v ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then
23: start IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v)
24: end
25: igc2(v) ≡(
∃(〈PRE-PREPARE, hpp, rpp, B〉σsv , id) ∈ IRM v :
id /∈ oldPrePrepareMessagesAlreadyProcessedv ∧
hpp < hv ∧
sv = proposer(chainv[0 : hpp − 1], rpp) ∧
B = block(chainv[hpp]))
→
26: multicastv 〈COMMIT, hpp, rpp, KEC(B),CS(B, v)〉σv to validatorshpp,v
27: oldPrePrepareMessagesAlreadyProcessedv ←
oldPrePrepareMessagesAlreadyProcessedv ∪ {id}
• block(FB) denotes the block included in the finalised block FB ;
• The function isValidBlock(B,Bparent) is defined to be true if and only if block B is a valid
Ethereum block with parent Bparent. For the purpose of this work, we consider that
isValidBlock(B,Bparent) only verifies the following fields of the standard Ethereum header:
parentHash, stateRoot, transactionsRoot, receiptsRoot, logsBloom, number, gasLimit, gasUsed;
• KEC(B) corresponds to the application of the Keccak hash function to B;
• sign(H, v) corresponds to the signature of the validator v over the hash H ;
• recValidator(H, signature) corresponds to the validator whose signature of the hash H corre-
sponds to signature, i.e. recValidator(H, sign( H, v)) ≡ v ;
• Quorum(n) is defined as f(n) · 2 + 1;
• now(v) corresponds to the current time for node v;
• start p(·) corresponds to spawning a new process p(·). This can be expressed in process algebra
by replacing the current process with the parallel composition of p(·) with the current process.
• stop p(·) corresponds to stopping process p(·). This can be expressed in process algebra by
means of either communication channels where the process executing the stop statement sends
a stop signal to the target process or via the used of shared state variables.
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3.4 IBFT(v) Specification
As described by Equations (2) and (3), the IBFT protocol executed by a node v corresponds to execut-
ing the initialisation procedure ibftInit(v) followed by a recursive execution of the non-deterministic
choice between guarded commands igc1(v) and igc2(v).
Guarded command igc1(v) is enabled when node v receives a valid finalised block for the next ex-
pected block height, i.e. hv. We say that a finalised block FB is valid for validator v if and only
if isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB , v), which corresponds to the logical conjunction of the following two
conditions, is true:
• at least Quorum(n) of the commit seals included in the finalisation proof of FB are signed by
validators included in the set of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol, where n ≡ n(chainv[0 : h− 1]);
• the block included in FB is a valid Ethereum block.
When guarded command igc1(v) is executed, then (i) v adds the finalised block to its local blockchain,
(ii) if v is a validator for the hv-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol then v aborts the
hv-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, (iii) v advances hv to hv + 1 and (iv) if v is a
validator for the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol instance for the new value of hv, then v starts that
instance.
Guarded command igc2(v) will be described in the following sub-section.
3.5 IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) Specification
This sub-section describes the execution of a generic h instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol
for validator v which, described by Equations (3) and (4), corresponds to the execution of the fpInit(h, v)
step followed by the recursive execution of the non-deterministic choice between the guarded commands(
fpgci(h, v)
)
i∈[7]
.
The IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol is organised in rounds, starting from round 0, where validators
progress to the next round once they suspect that in the current round they will not be able to decide
on the block to be included in the finalised block with height h. Both in the pseudocode and here, the
current round for the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v is denoted
by rh,v.
For each round, one of the validators is selected to play the role of block proposer. This selection is
operated by the evaluation of proposer(chainv[0 : h−1], rh,v) where proposer(·, ·) is a deterministic
function of the chain of blocks from the genesis block until the block with height h− 1 and the current
round number.
The pseudocode at lines 29 to 31 introduces the following macros:
• nh,v: number of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for val-
idator v;
• validatorsh,v: validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for val-
idator v;
• proposerh,v(rh,v): proposer for round rh,v of the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol for validator v.
These macros are used both in the pseudocode and in this section to simplify the notation when
describing the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for validator v.
For the purpose of this work, we do not define the proposer selection function, but we state that
it ensures that all of the validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol are
selected for any sequence of nh,v consecutive rounds.
During the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, when specific conditions are met, a validator v can lock
on a block B, which corresponds to the pseudocode in Algorithms 2 to 4 setting lockedBlockh,v to a
value different from ⊥ (see line 70). However, regardless of whether a validator v is locked or not, v
always unlocks (sets lockedBlockh,v to ⊥) when a new IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol instance starts
(see line 37).
As specified by the StartNewRound procedure (line 44), at the beginning of the current round
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Algorithm 2: Sequential steps of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process (initialisa-
tion).
28: Macro Expansions:
29: nh,v expands to: n(chainv[0 : h − 1])
30: validatorsh,v expands to: validators(chainv[0 : h − 1])
31: proposerh,v(rh,v) expands to: proposer(chainv[0 : h− 1], rh,v)
32: Functions:
33: RoundT imerT imeout(r)≡ timeoutForRoundZero · 2r
34: CS(B, v)≡ sign(KEC(B), v)
35: Initialisation:
36: fpInit(h, v)≡
37: lockedBlockh,v ← ⊥
38: StartNewRound(0, h, v)
39: Procedures:
40: def moveToNewRound(r, h, v):
41: rh,v ← r
42: roundAlreadyStartedh,v ← false
43: acceptedBlockh,v ← ⊥
44: def StartNewRound(r,h, v):
45: moveToNewRound(r, h, v)
46: roundAlreadyStartedh,v ← true
47: commitSenth,v ← false
48: finalisedBlockSenth,v ← false
49: roundT imerExpirationh,v[rh,v]← now(v) +RoundT imerT imeout(rh,v)
50: if v = proposerh,v(rh,v) then
51: if lockedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ then
52: B ← lockedBlockh,v
53: else
54: B ← createNewProposedBlock(h, v)
55: end
56: multicastv 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, B〉σv to validatorsh,v
57: end
58: def moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(r,h, v):
59: moveToNewRound(r, h, v)
60: multicastv 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rh,v〉σv to validatorsh,v
rh,v, if v is the selected block proposer for round rh,v, then v multicasts a Pre-Prepare message
〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, B〉σprh,v
to all validators (including itself) where, if v is locked on a block
then B = lockedBlockh,v, otherwise B can be any valid block for height h. The pseudocode uses
createNewProposedBlock(h, v) to represent the creation of a new block with height h by validator v.
Honest validators employ a fair transaction selection algorithm to decide which transactions to include
in the next block. The definition of such algorithm is outside the scope of this work.
As specified by lines 62 to 65, a validator v accepts a Pre-Prepare message 〈PRE-PREPARE, hpp, rpp, B〉
if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
• v is currently running the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol instance hpp, i.e hpp = h ;
• v is in round rpp, i.e. rpp = rh,v;
• the message is signed by the selected proposer for round rh,v and instance h of the IBFT-block-
finalisation-protocol;
• v has not already accepted a Pre-Prepare message for round rh,v in the h-th instance of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, i.e. acceptedBlockh,v = ⊥;
• v is not locked on a block different from B;
• block B is a valid block for height h.
When a validator v accepts a Pre-Prepare message, it multicasts a Prepare message
〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(B)〉σv (see line 65) to all validators. We refer to the block included in a
Pre-Prepare message for round r that validator v has accepted in instance h as the accepted block
for round r. Also, if validator v accepts message 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, r, B〉, by extension we say that
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Algorithm 3: Sequential steps of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process (PRE-
PREPARE and PREPARE).
61: Guarded Commands:
62: fpgc1(h, v) ≡(
acceptedBlockh,v = ⊥ ∧(
∃〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, B〉σsv ∈ RMv : sv = proposerh,v(rh,v)
)
)
→
63: if (lockedBlockh,v = ⊥ ∨ lockedBlockh,v = B) ∧ isValidBlock(B, chainv [h− 1]) then
64: acceptedBlockh,v ← B
65: multicastv 〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(B)〉σv to validatorsh,v
66: else
67: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)
68: end
69: fpgc2(h, v) ≡(
commitSenth,v = false ∧
acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ ∧
sizeOf({〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(acceptedBlockh,v)〉σsv ∈ RMv |
sv ∈ validatorsh,v}
) ≥ Quorum(nh,v))
→
70: lockedBlockh,v ← acceFptedBlockh,v
71: fpgc3(h, v) ≡(
commitSenth,v = false ∧
lockedBlockh,v 6= ⊥∧((
∃〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, lockedBlockh,v〉σsv ∈ RMv : sv = proposerh,v(rh,v)
)
∨(
∃〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(lockedBlockh,v)〉σsv ∈ RMv : sv ∈ validatorsh,v
))
)
→
72: multicastv
〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, KEC(lockedBlockh,v),CS(lockedBlockh,v, v)〉σv to validatorsh,v
73: commitSenth,v ← true
validator v accepts block B in round r. Both in the pseudocode and in the remainder of this section,
acceptedBlockh,v corresponds to the block accepted by validator v for the current round of the in-
stance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol. acceptedBlockh,v is equal to ⊥ if validator v has not
accepted any Pre-Prepare message for the current round.
As specified by the guarded command at line 69, if (i) validator v has accepted a block in the current
round (rh,v) of instance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol, i.e. acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ and
(ii) v has received at least Quorum(nh,v) Prepare messages for the current round of instance h of
the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol with Keccak hash matching the Keccak hash of the accepted
block for the current round, then validator v locks on the accepted block for the current round, i.e
lockh,v ← acceptedBlockh,v.
As specified by the guarded command at line 71, if validator v has locked on a block, i.e. lockh,v 6= ⊥
then the first time that one of the conditions listed below is verified, v multicasts a Commit message
〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, KEC(lockh,v),CS(lockh,v, v)〉σv to all validators (including itself), where CS(lockh,v, v),
called commit seal, corresponds to the signature of v over the locked block lockh,v.
• v has received a Pre-Prepare message for the locked block lockh,v and current round of the h
instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol;
• v has received a Prepare message for a Keccak hash matching the Keccak hash of the locked
block KEC(lockh,v) and current round of the h instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
The pseudocode uses the state variable commitSenth,v to indicate that, for a given round, the Commit
message is sent at most once. Indeed, commitSenth,v is set to true at line 73 and reset to false in
the StartNewRound procedure at line 47. In the IBFT implementation [10], CS(B, v) is actually a
signature over a modified version of block B, but in this work we consider the simplified definition
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Algorithm 4: Sequential steps of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process (COMMIT
and ROUND-CHANGE).
74: Guarded Commands:
75: fpgc4(h, v) ≡(
acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ ∧(
∃CM ∈ P(RMv) :
sizeOf(CM) ≥ Quorum(nh,v) ∧
(∀cm ∈ CM : cm = 〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, KEC(acceptedBlockh,v), ∗〉σ∗) ∧
(∀〈cm〉σsv , 〈cm
′〉σsv′ ∈ CM : cm 6= cm
′ =⇒ sv 6= sv′))
∧
finalisedBlockSenth,v = false)
→
76: finalisedBlockSenth,v ← true
77: if
(
∀〈*, ∗, ∗, ∗, cs〉σ∗ ∈ CM : cs is of the correct size
)
∧
wellFormedToAddFinalProof(acceptedBlockh,v) then
78: lockedBlockh,v ← acceptedBlockh,v
79: let finalisationProof ≡ {cs | 〈*, ∗, ∗, ∗, cs〉σsv ∈ CM}
80: FB ← 〈acceptedBlockh,v, finalisationProof〉
81: multicast 〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB〉 to all nodes
82: else
83: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)
84: lockedBlockh,v ← ⊥
85: end
86: fpgc5(h, v) ≡(
∃rrc :
sizeOf({〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rrc〉σsv ∈ RMv | sv ∈ validatorsh,v}) ≥ f(nh,v) + 1 ∧
rrc > rh,v)
→
87: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rrc, h, v)
88: fpgc6(h, v) ≡(
now(v) ≥ roundT imerExpirationh,v[rh,v]
)
→
89: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)
90: fpgc7(h, v) ≡(
∃rrc :
sizeOf({〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rrc〉σsv ∈ RMv | sv ∈ validatorsh,v
) ≥ Quorumopt(nh,v) ∧(
rrc > rh,v ∨ (rrc = rh,v ∧ roundAlreadyStartedh,v = false)
)
)
→
91: StartNewRound(rrc, h, v)
provided above as the differences between this definition and the complete one do not affect the results
presented here.
The IBFT protocol also includes the following optimisation that, for brevity, we have omitted from
the pseudocode description. Commit messages are treated as Prepare messages when evaluating the
conditions for locking and sending Commit messages. For example, if Quorum(nh,v) = 4 and v accepts
a Pre-Prepare message for height h, round rh,v and block B, 2 Prepare messages for height h, round
rh,v and block with Keccak hash matching KEC(B), and 2 Commit messages for the same height, round
and block hash, then v locks on B and sends a Commit message for height h, round rh,v and block
hash KEC(B).
Additionally, as specified by the guarded command at line 25 in Algorithm 1, if a validator v receives a
〈PRE-PREPARE, hpp, rpp, Bpp〉message and all of the following conditions are verified, then v multicasts
a Commit message 〈COMMIT, hpp, rpp, KEC(Bpp),CS(Bpp, v)〉σv to all validators (including itself):
• the Pre-Prepare message is for a previous block height, i.e. hpp < hv;
• the Pre-Prepare message is signed by the selected proposer for round rpp and instance hpp;
• Bpp matches the Ethereum block contained in the finalised block with height hpp included in the
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local blockchain of validator v.
As specified by lines 73 to 81, the first time that all of the following conditions are verified for validator
v, (i) v locks on the accepted block acceptedBlockh,v (line 78) and (ii) broadcasts a finalised block
including the accepted block acceptedBlockh,v and related finalisation proof:
• v has accepted a block in the current round (rh,v) of instance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol, i.e. acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥;
• v has received Commit messages, from at least Quorum(n) distinct validatorsh,v, for height
h, current round rh,v of instance h and Keccak hash matching the Keccak hash of the accepted
block KEC(acceptedBlockh,v);
• all of the commit seals received (as part of Commit messages) are of the correct size;
• the accepted block acceptedBlockh,v is well formed to allow adding the finalisation proof to it.
As indicated by line 79, the finalisation proof includes all of the commit seals included in Commit mes-
sages received for the current round (rh,v) of instance h and Keccak hash matching KEC(acceptedBlockh,v).
The pseudocode uses the state variable finalisedBlockSenth,v to trigger the transmission of a finalised
block only the first time that the conditions listed above are met. finalisedBlockSenth,v is set at
line 76 and reset in the StartNewRound procedure at line 48.
In alignment with PBFT, IBFT relies on a round change sub-protocol to detect whether the selected
proposer may be Byzantine and causing the protocol to never terminate. When one of the conditions
listed below is satisfied for validator v while in round rh,v, v moves to a new round r
′ and multicasts
a Round-Change message 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, r′〉σv to all validators (including itself).
• Round Timer Expiry (line 88). Expiration of the round timer started by each validator at
the beginning of every round (see line 49). The length of the round time is exponential to the
round number. In this case v moves to round r′ = rh,v + 1.
• Pre-Prepare message not matching locked block (lines 66 to 67). Reception of a Pre-
Prepare message sent by the selected proposer for round rh,v with proposer block not matching
the block on which validator v is locked. In this case v moves to round r′ = rh,v + 1.
• Reception of f(n) + 1 Round-Change messages for future round (line 86). Reception
of f(n) + 1 Round-Change messages for instance h and round r′ with r′ > rh,v. In this case v
moves to round r′.
• Failure in creating the finalisation proof (lines 82 to 84). v has received at leastQuorum(nh,v)
Commit messages for instance h, current round and Keccak hash KEC(acceptedBlockh,v) and at
least one of the following conditions is verified:
– at least one of the commit seals included in the Commit messages received by a validator
for round rh,v and instance h is of the wrong size;
– the accepted block acceptedBlockh,v is not formatted correctly and does not allow adding
the finalisation proof to it.
If any of these conditions are verified, then v also unlocks before moving to the next round (see
line 84).
When validator v moves to a new round r′, the state variable acceptedBlockh,v is reset to ⊥ (see
line 43). As it can be noted from the pseudocode, moving to a new round (line 38) does not imply
starting a new round (line 44). As specified by guarded command fpgc7(h, v) at line 90, when a
validator v receives either Quorum(nh,v) Round-Change messages for instance h and round r
′ with
r′ > rh,v or Quorum(nh,v) Round-Change messages for instance h and round r
′ matching the current
round (i.e. r′ = rh,v) but the current round has yet to be started, then v starts round r
′.
Starting round r′ includes executing the following actions:
• v starts the round timer for round r′ with length roundTimerTimeout(r′);
• if v is the proposer for round r′, then v multicasts the following Pre-Prepare message to all
validators: 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, r′, B′〉σp
r′
where, if pr′ is locked on block B then B
′ = B, otherwise
B′ can be any valid block for instance h.
From here on the protocol proceeds as described above.
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4 Definitions
In this section we provide a series of definitions that will be used in the presentation of our persistence
and liveness analysis in Sections 5 to 7.
We define t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence as follows where t can be either a constant value or a
deterministic function of some sort.
Definition 2 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence). The IBFT protocol ensures t-Byzantine-fault-
tolerant persistence if and only if the following statement is true: provided that no more than t valida-
tors are Byzantine, the IBFT protocol guarantees the persistence property of distributed permissioned
transactions ledgers (see Definition 1).
The aim of the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol is to have all honest validators to
eventually decide on the block to be included in the finalised block with height h and broadcast the
finalised block to all the nodes.
In the context of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol we define safety as follows:
Definition 3 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety for the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol). The IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol ensures t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety if and only if it guarantees the
validity of the following statement: in the presence of no more than t Byzantine validators and provided
that all honest validators agree on the same validator set, the protocol ensures that instance h of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol can only produce a valid finalised block for height h and that no
two valid finalised blocks including different blocks can ever be produced by any instance h of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
Our following definitions of optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety follows directly from the known
upper-limit on the number of Byzantine nodes that a consensus protocol operating in an eventually
synchronous network can withstand [25]:
Definition 4 (Optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety threshold for the IBFT-block-finalisation-proto-
col). The IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety thresh-
old provided that for any instance h it guarantees f(nh) -Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety where nh is
the number of validators for the h-th instance of IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
The following two definitions are related to the liveness property of the IBFT protocol.
Definition 5 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant liveness). The IBFT protocol ensures t-Byzantine-fault-
tolerant liveness if and only if the following statement is true: provided that no more than t val-
idators are Byzantine, the IBFT protocol guarantees the liveness property of distributed permissioned
transactions ledgers (see Definition 1).
Definition 6 (t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol). The
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness if and only if, pro-
vided that no more than t validators are Byzantine, it guarantees that for any h instance of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol at least one honest validator will eventually be able to produce a
valid finalised block for height h.
5 Persistence Analysis
In this section we analyse the persistence property of the IBFT protocol that in conjunction with the
liveness property determines that overall robustness of the IBFT protocol as defined in Definition 1.
Any proof omitted in this section can be found in A.
Lemma 1. If the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol does not guarantee t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety,
then the IBFT protocol does not guarantee t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence.
Proof. Assume that v and v′ are two honest nodes such that the height of their local blockchain is h.
According to the Lemma, in presence of t Byzantine validators for height h, the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol can produce two different valid finalised blocks including blocks B and B′ respectively, with
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B 6= B′. Assume that transactions T and T ′, with T 6= T ′, are included at position i of blocks B
and B′ respectively. This is possible as B 6= B′. If this happens before GST (see the Network Model
definition in Section 2), then v could receive the finalised block including B while v′ could receive the
finalised block including B′. Since both finalised blocks are valid, v adds the finalised block including
B in position h of its local blockchain while v′ adds the finalisation block including B′ in position h
of its local blockchain. This equates to T being added in position (h, i) of the local ledger of v and T ′
being added in the same position (h, i) of the local ledger of v′, with T 6= T ′.
Lemma 2. A transaction T cannot appear in two different positions of the local blockchain of an
honest node.
Lemma 3. One of the necessary preconditions for an honest validator v to set hv to h is that all blocks
with height < h have been added to its local blockchain.
Proof. There is no line of pseudocode that removes a finalised block from the local blockchain. The
only point where finalised blocks are added to the local blockchain is line 17 which adds a finalised
block in position hv of the local chain. hv is set to 0 at the initialisation (fpInit(v)) and the only
point where hv is changed is line 21 where it is incremented by one. The observation that Line 21 is
executed any time that Line 17 is executed concludes the proof.
Lemma 4. One of the necessary preconditions for an honest validator v to start instance h of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol is that all blocks with height < h have been added to its local blockchain.
Proof. According to lines 13 and 23 of Algorithm 1, in an honest node starts instance h of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol, then hv = h. This and Lemma 3 concluded the proof.
Lemma 5. If the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerance safety and for
any possible sequence of finalised blocks FB0, . . . ,FBh≥0 stored in the local blockchain of any honest
validator, the number of Byzantine validators in validators(FB0, . . . ,FBh) is no more than t, then
no two valid finalised blocks for the same height but including two different blocks are ever produced by
any node, whether Byzantine or honest.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length h of the sequence of finalised blocks. Before proceeding
with the proof, we shall remind that (a) each validator computes the set of validators for their own
instance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol as a deterministic function of the chain of finalised
blocks from the genesis block to the block with height h− 1.
Base Case h = 1. Since we assume that all honest nodes have the same genesis block, all honest
validators will agree on same set of validators for first instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
The assumptions that no more than t of these validators are Byzantine and that the IBFT-block-
finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety imply the Lemma for the base case.
Inductive Case. For the inductive case we assume that the Lemma is true for all h′ such that
1 ≤ h′ < h and then we prove that the Lemma also holds for h. By Lemma 4, the assumption
for the inductive case and property (a), all honest validators that start instance h of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol agree on the same set of validators. The assumption that the IBFT-block-
finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety imply the Lemma for the inductive
case.
Lemma 6. If for any possible sequence of blocks FB0, . . . ,FBh≥0 stored in the local blockchain of any
honest validator, the number of Byzantine validators in validators(FB0, . . . ,FBh) is no more than
t, then the local blockchains of any two honest nodes v and v′ agree on any block with height h such
that 0 ≤ h < min(hv, hv′).
Proof. For a given h, such that 0 ≤ h < min(hv, hv′), Lemma 3 guarantees that both v and v
′ have
added a finalised block with height h to their respective local blockchains, and Lemma 5 implies that
both finalised blocks include the same block. Since all honest nodes have the same genesis block
and honest nodes only add valid finalised block to their local blockchains (see line 16), the Lemma is
proven.
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Lemma 7. The IBFT protocol guarantees condition (i) of t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence if and
only if the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety.
Proof. The forward direction is proved by Lemmas 2 and 6. The reverse direction is proved by Lemma 1.
Definition 4 and Lemma 7 lead to the following definition of optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant persis-
tence threshold.
Definition 7 (Optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence threshold for the IBFT protocol). The
IBFT protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence threshold provided that all
possible instances of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantee optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant
safety threshold.
Lemma 8. n− 1 ≥ Quorum(n) for any n ≥ 4.
Lemma 9. The IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol does not guarantee Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety
when operating in an eventually synchronous network (see Network Model definition in Section 2).
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. For this proof we use the inductive assumption of Lemma 6
which states that the local blockchains of all honest nodes are identical until the finalised block with
height h− 1. Therefore, since the set of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-
protocol is a function of the local blockchain until the block with height h − 1, this set is identical
amongst all honest validators. We denote the total number of validators for the h-th instance of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol with nh.
Below we provide a possible sequence of events that may occur before GST which leads two honest
nodes to create two valid finalised blocks for the same height h that include two different blocks. We
assume f(nh) ≥ 1 which implies nh ≥ 4. Let v be an honest validator, W be a set of size nh − 1
including all validators except v and Whonest be the subset of all honest validators included in W .
1. Let r be any round such that no honest validator has locked on any block. This is always the
case for r = 0. The proposer for round r, pr, multicasts a 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, r, B〉σpr message
to all validators (including itself).
2. All validators (both Byzantine and honest) receive the Pre-Prepare message sent by the proposer
and multicast the corresponding 〈PREPARE, h, r, KEC(B)〉 message to all validators (including
themselves).
3. All honest validators (Whonest ∪ {v}) receive the nh Prepare messages sent by all valida-
tors. Since nh ≥ Quorum(nh), all honest validators lock on block B and multicast a
〈COMMIT, h, r, KEC(B),CS(B, sender)〉σsender message to all other validators.
4. Byzantine validators also send a well-formed 〈COMMIT, h, r, KEC(B),CS(B, sender)〉σsender mes-
sage to honest validator v.
5. However, Byzantine validators send Commit messages containing a commit seal of the wrong
size to all honest validators included in set Whonest.
6. As result of events 3 to 5, each of the nh validators (whether Byzantine or honest) has sent a
Commit message to all the honest validators, v will receive only well-formed Commit messages,
whereas the Commit messages sent by Byzantine validators that the validators in Whonest will
receive will include a commit seal of the wrong size. Assume, without loss of generality, that
at least one of the Commit messages with the commit seal of the wrong size is included in
the first Quorum(nh) Commit messages received by each of the honest validators included in
set Whonest. Therefore, once each validator included in Whonest receives Quorum(nh) Commit
messages, since at least one of them has a commit seal of the wrong size, it unlocks and sends a
〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, r′ = r + 1〉 message to all validators (including itself).
In contrast, v only receives Commit messages with valid commit seals and therefore it creates a
valid finalised block including block B and broadcasts it to all the nodes. However, we assume
that the finalised block created by v will not be received by any validator before the end of the
last event of this sequence of events. This is possible as GST has yet to be reached.
7. Like validators in Whonest, all Byzantine validators in W also send a 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, r
′〉
message to all validators.
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8. All validators in Whonest receive all of the Round-Change messages for round r
′ sent by all
validators in W , both Byzantine and honest. According to Lemma 8, since nh ≥ 4, the following
holds nh − 1 ≥ Quorum(nh). Therefore all validators in Whonest start round 1.
9. Assume, without loss of generality, that the proposer of round r′ = r + 1, pr′ , is not v. pr′
multicasts a 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, r′, B′〉σp
r′
message with B′ 6= B to all validators. This is possible
as pr′ is either Byzantine or honest but included in set Whonest and has therefore unlocked at
event 6.
10. All validators in W receive the Pre-Prepare message sent by pr′ and therefore broadcast a
〈PREPARE, h, r′, KEC(B′)〉 message to all validators (including themselves).
11. All honest validators included in Whonest receive the nh − 1 Prepare messages sent by all
validators included in set W . According to Lemma 8, since nh ≥ 4, the following holds
nh − 1 ≥ Quorum(nh). Therefore all honest validators included in set Whonest lock on block
B′ and multicast a 〈COMMIT, h, r′, KEC(B′),CS(B′, sender)〉σsender message to all other valida-
tors. Byzantine validators also multicasts the same Commit message. All Commit messages sent
for this round include a valid commit seal.
12. All honest validators included in set Whonest receive the nh − 1 Commit messages sent by all
validators included in set W . According to Lemma 8, since nh ≥ 4, the following holds nh− 1 ≥
Quorum(nh). Therefore, all honest validators in set Whonest create a valid finalised block for
block B′.
This concludes the proof as two valid finalised blocks including different blocks (B and B′) have been
created at events 6 and 12.
Lemma 10. The IBFT protocol does not guarantee condition (i) of t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant persis-
tence.
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 7 and 9.
Lemma 11. ∀n ≥ 1 : n > 2 · f(n)
Lemma 12. The IBFT protocol does not guarantee condition (ii) of t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant per-
sistence even if the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety and
t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Indeed, we assume that the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol
guarantees both t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety and t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness and show
a sequence of events that, if occurring before GST, lead the IBFT protocol to a state where condition
(ii) of the persistence property is violated. We denote the number of validators for the h-th instance
of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol with nh. Considering that no Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety
or weak-liveness can be ensured if t = 0, we assume t ≥ 1. Since f(nh) is the upper limit for t,
this implies f(nh) ≥ 1, which in turns implies nh ≥ 4. Lemma 11 proves that nh > 2 · f(nh) which
implies that nh > 2 · t. We also assume that all validators are running the h-th instance of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol. Let V be a set of t honest validators and W be the complement of V for
instance h of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol. W is therefore of size nh − t and may contain up
to t Byzantine validators.
1. Validators in set W produce a finalised block, say FB , but no messages sent by validators in
V while in instance h, including the Finalised-Block message for FB , will ever be received by
validators in set V . This is possible as (i) GST has yet to be reached and (ii) we assume that
the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness which
implies that a set of nh − t validators can produce a finalised block without needing to commu-
nicate with any validators outside that set. Consequently, validators in set W terminate their
h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol and start the h + 1-th instance, while all
validators in set V continue to run the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
Without loss of generality, assume that finalised block FB does not change the validator set, i.e.
the validator set for instance h + 1 matches the validator set of instance h which implies that
nh+1 = nh.
2. t of the validators in set W stop communicating and never restart. This is possible as we assume
that up to t of the validators in set W may be Byzantine and therefore act arbitrarily. As
consequence of this, out of the nh validators in the validator set for instance h+ 1, 2 · t of them
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do not participate in this instance as t validators are still running instance h and t Byzantine
validators have stopped and will never restart. Since 2 · t > t, weak-liveness of the IBFT-block-
finalisation-protocol for instance h+1 does not hold and therefore there is no guarantee that any
new finalised block in instance h+ 1 is produced under this condition.
Also, the remaining nh − 2 · t honest validators of set W , running the h + 1-th instance of the
IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol send Commit messages for instance h only if they receive a Pre-
Prepare message for instance h with a proposed block matching the block included in FB . Since
none of the messages transmitted by validators in set W while they were running instance h
has been received by validators in set V , there is no guarantee that a validator in set V will
eventually send a Pre-Prepare message with a proposed block matching the block included in
FB and therefore there is no guarantee that any of the honest validators in set W will ever again
participate in instance h by sending Commit messages.
Since nh−t of the nh validators do not actively participate in instance h, and nh > 2·t→ nh−t > t
implies that weak-liveness of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol does not hold for instance h
either, there is no guarantee that any finalised block in instance h will ever be produced by
validators in set V .
In the system state resulting from the last event of the sequence of events presented above there is no
guarantee that any new finalised block for height h will ever be broadcast. Considering that we assume
that finalised block FB produced by validators in set W will never be received by validators in set V ,
there is no guarantee that any of the transactions included in the block included in the finalised block
FB will ever be added to the transaction ledger of any validator in set V .
Theorem 1. The IBFT finalisation protocol is not Byzantine-fault-tolerant when operating in an
eventually synchronous network.
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 10 and 12.
6 Modification IBFT-M1 protocol: Achieve optimal Byzantine-
fault-tolerance persistence
In this section we describe a modification to the IBFT protocol to achieve optimal Byzantine-fault-
tolerance persistence. We denote the protocol resulting from this modification as IBFT-M1 protocol
and the block finalisation protocol of IBFT-M1 as IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol.
Algorithm 5 details the sequential steps for the IBFT-M1 protocol while Algorithms 7 to 8 detail the
sequential steps for IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol where yellow background colour is used to
highlight the pieces of pseudocode that differ from the original protocol and strikethrough lines are
used to indicate pieces of pseudocode that are no longer present in the modified protocol.
The summary of list of changes to be applied to obtain the modified protocol follows:
(PM-1) The protocol used by IBFT to transmit finalised blocks over the ÐΞVp2p protocol is modified
so that nodes query their peers about the availability of new finalised blocks on a regular basis;
(PM-2) Only consider Commit messages that have a commit seal signed by the sender of the Com-
mit message. Since we assume a digital signature scheme that ensures signature uniqueness,
verifying the signature implies verifying that the size of the commit seal is correct.
(PM-3) Embed the verification that the block included in the accepted Pre-Prepare message allows
adding the finalisation proof to it in the series of verifications performed by the isValid-
Block(·) function and, therefore, remove the wellFormedToAddFinalProof(B) check from
the list of verifications listed at line 77 of Algorithm 4.
(PM-4) Remove the Failure in creating the finalisation proof condition from the list of con-
ditions that trigger sending Round-Change messages. This corresponds to the condition(
∀〈*, ∗, ∗, ∗, cs〉σ∗ ∈ CM : cs is of the correct size
)
at line 77 and block lines 82 to 84 of
Algorithm 4. This means that this condition is never checked and therefore no validator can
unlock as consequence of this condition being true.
(PM-5) Remove the guarded command at line 25 as it does not provide any value to the protocol.
While we do not provide a formal proof of such a statement in this paper, its correctness can be
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Algorithm 5: IBFT-M1 protocol for node v
1: Functions:
2: Quorumopt(n)≡
⌈
2n
3
⌉
3: isV alidF inalisationProof(FB , v)≡
4: sizeOf({cs ∈ finalisationProof(FB) |
recValidator(KEC(block(FB)), cs) ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1])}
) ≥ Quorumopt(n(chainv [0 : hv − 1]))
5: isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB , v)≡
6: isV alidF inalisationProof(FB , v) ∧
isValidBlock(block(FB), block(chainv[hv − 1]))
7: Initialisation:
8: ibftInit(v)≡
9: chainv[0] ← genesis block
10: hv ← 1
11: oldPrePrepareMessagesAlreadyProcessedv ← {}
12: if v ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then
13: start IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol(hv , v)
14: end
15: Guarded Commands:
16: igc1(v) ≡(
∃〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB〉 ∈ RMv :
blockHeight(block(FB)) = hv ∧
isV alidF inalisedBlock(FB , v))
→
17: chainv[hv] ← FB
18: if v ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then
19: stop IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v)
20: end
21: hv ← hv + 1
22: if v ∈ validators(chainv[0 : hv − 1]) then
23: start IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol(hv, v)
24: end
25: igc2(v) ≡ . . .
informally proved by noticing that (i) as shown in Section 6, the modified protocol incorporat-
ing the modifications listed here guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance persistence and
(ii) none of the proposed modifications listed in Section 7.2 for addressing the liveness issue of
the IBFT protocol involves sending Commit messages in response to Pre-Prepare messages for
old blocks, which is essentially the behaviour that the guarded command at line 25 specifies.
(PM-6) Replace the Quorum(n) function of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol with the Quorumopt(n)
function defined as
⌈
2n
3
⌉
.
Modification (PM-1) is applied to ensure condition (ii) of the Persistence property (see Definition 1)
provided that the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness.
Modifications (PM-2), (PM-3) and (PM-4) are applied to achieve Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence.
Modification (PM-5) removes unnecessary protocol behaviours. Modification (PM-6) is applied to
achieve optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance persistence.
6.1 Persistence Analysis of the IBFT-M1 protocol
In this section we analyse the persistence property of the IBFT-M1 protocol and show that the IBFT-
M1 protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerant persistence threshold.
We denote the total number of validators for the h-th instance of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-
protocol with nh. This definition is however meaningful only if all honest nodes agree on the same set
of validators, thus we will add this assumption to all the Lemmas where nh is used.
Any proof omitted in this section can be found in B.
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Algorithm 6: Sequential steps of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process (initiali-
sation).
26: Macro Expansions:
27: nh,v expands to: n(chainv[0 : h − 1])
28: validatorsh,v expands to: validators(chainv[0 : h − 1])
29: proposerh,v(rh,v) expands to: proposer(chainv[0 : h− 1], rh,v)
30: Functions:
31: RoundT imerT imeout(r)≡ timeoutForRoundZero · 2r
32: CS(B, v)≡ sign(KEC(B), v)
33: Initialisation:
34: fpInit(h, v)≡
35: lockedBlockh,v ← ⊥
36: StartNewRound(0, h, v)
37: Procedures:
38: def moveToNewRound(r, h, v):
39: rh,v ← r
40: roundAlreadyStartedh,v ← false
41: acceptedBlockh,v ← ⊥
42: def StartNewRound(r,h, v):
43: moveToNewRound(r, h, v)
44: roundAlreadyStartedh,v ← true
45: commitSenth,v ← false
46: finalisedBlockSenth,v ← false
47: roundT imerExpirationh,v[rh,v]← now(v) +RoundT imerT imeout(rh,v)
48: if v = proposerh,v(rh,v) then
49: if lockedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ then
50: B ← lockedBlockh,v
51: else
52: B ← createNewProposedBlock(h, v)
53: end
54: multicastv 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, B〉σv to validatorsh,v
55: end
56: def moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(r,h, v):
57: moveToNewRound(r, h, v)
58: multicastv 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rh,v〉σv to validatorsh,v
Lemma 13. For all gc ∈ {fpgc1(h, v), . . . , fpgc7(h, v)} executed after the first execution of either
fpgc2(h, v) or fpgc4(h, v) the following invariant, expressed as a Hoare triple, holds for some B 6= ⊥
{lockedBlockh,v = B}gc{lockedBlockh,v = B}
Proof. We will show that the Lemma holds for fpgc2(h, v). Exactly the same reasoning can be applied
to prove that it also holds for fpgc4(h, v).
fpgc2(h, v) can only be executed if acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥. Since, fpgc2(h, v) assigns acceptedBlockh,v
to lockedBlockh,v, then lockedBlockh,v = acceptedBlockh,v = B 6= ⊥ for some B 6= ⊥ after the
execution of fpgc2(h, v). The only guarded commands that can change the value of lockedBlockh,v
are fpgc2(h, v) and fpgc4(h, v). The execution of both guarded commands preserves the invariant
stated in the Lemma if acceptedBlockh,v = B is true before their execution. acceptedBlockh,v = B
can only be changed by the execution of fpgc1(h, v) which is however disabled after the first execution
of fpgc2(h, v) as the guard of fpgc1(h, v) requires acceptedBlockh,v = ⊥.
Lemma 14. If an honest validator v locks on block B while executing the h-th instance of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol, then v will be locked on block B for rest of the execution of the h-th instance
of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol.
Proof. The only sequential steps where validator v can lock on a block B, i.e. lockedBlockh,v ← B,
is in the execution of either fpgc2(h, v) or fpgc4(h, v). This observation and Lemma 13 imply the
Lemma.
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Algorithm 7: Sequential steps of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process (PRE-
PREPARE and PREPARE).
59: Guarded Commands:
60: fpgc1(h, v) ≡(
acceptedBlockh,v = ⊥ ∧(
∃〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, B〉σsv ∈ RMv : sv = proposerh,v(rh,v)
)
)
→
61: if (lockedBlockh,v = ⊥ ∨ lockedBlockh,v = B) ∧ isValidBlock(B, chainv [h− 1]) then
62: acceptedBlockh,v ← B
63: multicastv 〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(B)〉σv to validatorsh,v
64: else
65: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)
66: end
67: fpgc2(h, v) ≡(
commitSenth,v = false ∧
acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ ∧
sizeOf({〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(acceptedBlockh,v)〉σsv ∈ RMv |
sv ∈ validatorsh,v}
) ≥ Quorumopt(nh,v))
→
68: lockedBlockh,v ← acceptedBlockh,v
69: fpgc3(v) ≡(
commitSenth,v = false ∧
lockedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ ∧((
∃〈PRE-PREPARE, h, rh,v, lockedBlockh,v〉σsv ∈ RMv : sv = proposerh,v(rh,v)
)
∨(
∃〈PREPARE, h, rh,v, KEC(lockedBlockh,v)〉σsv ∈ RMv : sv ∈ validatorsh,v
))
)
→
70: multicastv
〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, KEC(lockedBlockh,v),CS(lockedBlockh,v, v)〉σv to validatorsh,v
71: commitSenth,v ← true
Lemma 15. If an honest validator v is locked on block B while in round r of the h-th instance of
the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol, then v will be locked on block B for any round r′ ≥ r of the
same instance h.
Proof. After the initialisation of instance h validator v is not locked on any block. Let r′ be the first
round where v locks on block B. Lemma 14 and the observation that round number rh,v increments
monotonically prove the Lemma.
Lemma 16. For any nh ≥ 1, provided that the number of Byzantine validators is ≤ f(nh), the
intersection of any two sets of Quorumopt(nh) validators is guaranteed to include an honest validator.
Lemma 17. If an honest validator v sends a Commit message for block B (i.e
〈COMMIT, h, r, KEC(B),CS(B, v)〉σv ) while running the h-th instance of the IBFT-M1-block-
finalisation-protocol, then (i) validator v is locked on B and (ii) the height of block B is h, i.e.
blockHeight(B) = h.
Proof. The only line of the pseudocode of Algorithms 5 to 8 where a Commit message is sent is line 70
and this line only sends Commit messages for blocks on which validator v is locked. This proves
condition (i) of the Lemma.
The only sequential steps where node v can lock on a block are fpgc2(h, v) and fpgc4(h, v). In
either case, lockedBlockh,v is set to acceptedBlockh,v and either guarded command can be executed
only if acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥. The only sequential step where acceptedBlockh,v is set is fpgc1(h, v)
where acceptedBlockh,v is set to B provided that isValidBlock(B, chainv[h− 1]) is true. According
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Algorithm 8: Sequential steps of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol(h, v) process (COM-
MIT and ROUND-CHANGE).
72: Guarded Commands:
73: fpgc4(h, v) ≡(
acceptedBlockh,v 6= ⊥ ∧(
∃CM ∈ P(RMv) :
sizeOf(CM) ≥ Quorumopt(nh,v) ∧
(∀cm ∈ CM : cm = 〈COMMIT, h, rh,v, KEC(acceptedBlockh,v), cs〉σsv ∧
recValidator(KEC(acceptedBlockh,v), cs) = sv) ∧
(∀〈cm〉σsv , 〈cm
′〉σsv′ ∈ CM : cm 6= cm
′ =⇒ sv 6= sv′))
∧
finalisedBlockSenth,v = false)
→
74: finalisedBlockSenth,v ← true
75: if
(
∀〈*, ∗, ∗, ∗, cs〉σ∗ ∈ CM : cs is of the correct size
)
∧
wellFormedToAddFinalProof(acceptedBlockh,v ) then
76: lockedBlockh,v ← acceptedBlockh,v
77: let finalisationProof ≡ {cs | 〈*, ∗, ∗, ∗, cs〉σsv ∈ CM}
78: FB ← 〈acceptedBlockh,v, finalisationProof〉
79: multicast 〈FINALISED-BLOCK,FB〉 to all nodes
80: else
81: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)82: lockedBlockh,v ← ⊥
83:
84: fpgc5(h, v) ≡(
∃rrc :
sizeOf({〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rrc〉σsv ∈ RMv | sv ∈ validatorsh,v}) ≥ f(nh,v) + 1 ∧
rrc > rh,v)
→
85: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rrc, h, v)
86: fpgc6(h, v) ≡(
now(v) ≥ roundT imerExpirationh,v[rh,v]
)
→
87: moveToNewRoundAndSendRoundChange(rh,v + 1, h, v)
88: fpgc7(h, v) ≡(
∃rrc :
sizeOf({〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, rrc〉σsv ∈ RMv | sv ∈ validatorsh,v
) ≥ Quorumopt(nh,v) ∧(
rrc > rh,v ∨ (rrc = rh,v ∧ roundAlreadyStartedh,v = false)
)
)
→
89: StartNewRound(rrc, h, v)
to equation (50) of the Ethereum Yellow Paper [2], isValidBlock(B,Bparent) can be true only if
blockHeight(B) = blockHeight(Bparent)+ 1. This concludes the proof of condition (ii).
Lemma 18. For any instance h of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol such that all honest nodes
agree on the same set of validators and the number of Byzantine validators is ≤ f(nh), no two valid
finalised blocks for the same height h including different blocks can be produced.
Proof. A block for height h is considered finalised only if it contains a valid finalisation proof. A
finalisation proof is valid only if it contains at least Quorumopt(nh) commit seals signed by different
validators in validatorsh,v. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that (a) there exist two finalised
blocks FB and FB ′ including block B and B′ respectively, with B 6= B′. Since, according to Lemma 16,
the intersection of any two sets ofQuorumopt(nh) validators is guaranteed to include an honest validator
and we assume unforgeability of digital signature, assumption (a) implies that there exists one honest
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validator v that produced both a commit seal for block B and commit seal for block B′. This, in
turn, implies that validator v sent a Commit message with block hash matching KEC(B) and a Commit
message with block hash matching KEC(B′) as commit seals are only included in Commit messages.
However, according to condition (i) of Lemma 17, honest validators only send Commit messages for
the block that they are locked on. Therefore, since we assume that KEC(·) is a collision-resistant hash
function (i.e B 6= B′ → KEC(B) 6= KEC(B′) with high probability ), for assumption (a) to be satisfied
v must have locked on both block B and B′. This is in clear contradiction with Lemma 15.
Lemma 19. For any instance h of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol such that all honest nodes
agree on the same set of validators and the number of Byzantine validators is ≤ f(nh), only valid
finalised blocks for height h can be produced.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that there exists a valid finalised block FB for
height h′ produced by the h-th instance of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol, with h′ 6= h.
Since FB is a valid finalised block produced by instance h of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol,
it must contain Quorumopt(nh) commit seals. Given that Quorumopt(nh) > f(nh) for any nh ≥ 1,
then FB must contain at least one commit seal signed by an honest validator. Since commit seals
are only included in Commit messages, this in turn implies that at least one honest validator sent a
Commit message for a block with height h′ while running the h-th instance of the IBFT-M1-block-
finalisation-protocol. This is in contradiction with condition (ii) of Lemma 17.
Lemma 20. For any instance h of the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol such that all honest nodes
agree on the same set of validators, then Byzantine-fault-tolerant safety is guaranteed if and only if the
number of Byzantine validators is ≤ f(nh).
Proof. The forward direction of the Lemma is proved by Lemmas 18 and 19 while the reverse direction
is a direct consequence of f(nh) being the maximum number of Byzantine validators that any consensus
protocol operating in an eventually synchronous network can withstand [25] (see also Section 2).
Theorem 2. The IBFT-M1 protocol guarantees optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance persistence thresh-
old.
Proof. Follows from Definition 7 of optimal Byzantine-fault-tolerance persistence threshold and
Lemma 20.
6.2 Liveness impact of modification IBFT-M1
In this section we show that modification IBFT-M1 does not affect the weak-liveness of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol.
Lemma 21. ∀n ≥ 0 : Quorumopt(n) + f(n) ≤ n
The proof of the previous Lemma can be found in C.
Lemma 22. The liveness property of the IBFT protocol is not affected if Quorum(n) is replaced by
Quorumopt(n) provided that the number of Byzantine validators for any instance h of the IBFT-M1
protocol is ≤ f(nh).
Proof. Lemma 21 implies that for any round of the h-th instance of the IBFT-M1 protocol, there
exists at least Quorumopt(nh) honest validators. This, in turn, implies that once GST is reached, if
all nh honest validators are unlocked and the proposer for the current round is honest, then Byzan-
tine validators cannot prevent honest validators from receiving Quorumopt(nh) Prepare messages and
Quorumopt(nh) Commit messages for the block proposed by the block proposer.
Theorem 3. The modification IBFT-M1 does not affect the weak-liveness property of the IBFT-block-
finalisation-protocol.
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Proof. The proof is given informally by contending that each of the modifications listed in Section 6
does not affect the weak-liveness property of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol:
• Modification (PM-1): this modification only deals with blocks that have already been finalised.
• Modification (PM-2): honest validators only send Commit messages with a commit seal signed
by them and, according the Lemma 21, there are at least Quorumopt(nh) honest validators.
• Modification (PM-3): honest proposers send Pre-Prepare messages that include a block well
formed for adding a finalisation proof to it and according the Lemma 21, there are at least
Quorumopt(nh) honest validators.
• Modification (PM-4): (i) by Modification (PM-3) only blocks that are well formed for adding a
finalisation proof to them are ever going to be accepted by an honest validator and (ii) line 84
in Algorithm 4 is only executed if a block included in a Pre-Prepare message has been accepted.
• Modification (PM-5): this modification only deals with sending Commit messages upon reception
of a Pre-Prepare message for an old instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol for which the
node receiving the Pre-Prepare message has already received a valid finalised block, i.e. instances
of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol that have already achieved weak-liveness.
• Modification (PM-6): see Lemma 22.
7 Liveness Analysis
In this section we analyse the liveness property of the IBFT and IBFT-M1 protocols. Specifically, we
show that neither the IBFT protocol nor the IBFT-M1 protocol guarantee liveness when operating
in an eventually synchronous network model when either a Byzantine or a fail-stop failure model are
considered, and that the IBFT-M1 protocol may be modified in two ways to guarantee liveness.
7.1 Analysis of the IBFT and IBFT-M1 protocols
Any proof omitted in this section can be found in D.
Lemma 23. The IBFT protocol (IBFT-M1 protocol, resp.) guarantees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant live-
ness only if the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol (IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol, resp.) guaran-
tees t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness.
Proof. If the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol (IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol, resp.) does not
guarantee t-Byzantine-fault-tolerant weak-liveness, then there could exist an instance h of the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol (IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol, resp.) such that no finalised block
is ever produced. This implies that no finalised block with height ≥ h will ever be added to the
local blockchain of any honest node as honest nodes must add a finalised block with height h to their
local blockchain before being able to add any finalised block with height higher than h. Hence, any
transaction sent to all honest validators that is not already included in a finalised block with height
< h will never be added to the local blockchain of any honest validator.
Lemma 24. ∀n ≥ 4 ∧ n 6= 6 : n−Quorum(n) < Quorum(n)
Lemma 25. ∀n ≥ 0 : n−Quorumopt(n) < Quorumopt(n)
Lemma 26. For any h instance of the block finalisation protocol where nh ≥ 4, neither the IBFT-
block-finalisation-protocol nor the IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol guarantee weak-liveness in the
presence of a single faulty node. This is true even if the only type of node failure considered is fail-stop.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. This is achieved by providing a possible sequence of events,
that may occur before GST, which causes the protocol to be unable to create any new finalised block,
even once GST is reached. We consider events occurring during the h-th instance of the IBFT-block-
finalisation-protocoland IBFT-M1 protocol, and assume that one of the nh validators for the h-th
instance is faulty and therefore can stop communicating and never restart. Also, let us assume that
all of the events outlined below happen before GST. We consider three possible cases.
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Case 1: IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol with nh ≥ 4 ∧ nh 6= 6.
Let W be a subset of Quorum(nh) validators containing the proposer for round 1, p1, and the
faulty validator. Let V be the complement of W . The size of V is therefore nh − Quorum(nh)
which, according to Lemma 24, is < Quorum(nh) for nh ≥ 4 ∧ nh 6= 6. The immediate conse-
quence of the definition above is that all validators in V are honest. .
1. The proposer for round 0, p0, multicasts a Pre-Prepare message for block B
〈PRE-PREPARE, h, 0, B〉σp0 .
2. All validators reply with a Prepare message for block B 〈PREPARE, h, 0, KEC(B)〉.
3. All validators in V receive the Pre-Prepare message for block B and all of the Prepare
messages. Therefore, all validators in V lock on block B.
4. The round-timer expires before any other validator, except for those in set V , receives any
of the Prepare messages. Note that since ‖V ‖ < Quorum(nh) and only validators in V may
send a Commit messages for block B, no honest validator will ever produce a finalised block
including block B due to the Commit messages sent in round 0.
5. All validators send a Round-Change message 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, 1〉 to move to round 1.
6. All validators receive Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages and move to round 1.
7. p1 sends a Pre-Prepare message for block B
′ 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, 1, B′〉σp1 , with B
′ 6= B.
This is possible as p1 is not locked on any block since it is an element of set W which is
disjoint from set V .
8. All validators included in set V are locked on B, therefore when they receive the Pre-Prepare
message sent by p1 they reply with a Round-Change 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, 2〉 to move to
round 2.
9. All of the validators in set W respond to the Pre-Prepare for block B′ that they received
with a Prepare message for block B′ and round 1 〈PREPARE, h, 1, KEC(B′)〉. However, one of
these validators is faulty and stops just after sending a Prepare message and before sending
any Commit message. Set W now contains only Quorum(nh) − 1 < Quorum(nh) active
validators.
10. All honest validators in set W receive all the Prepare messages for block B′ sent by all
validators in W including the Prepare message sent by the faulty validator before stopping.
Since ‖W‖ ≥ Quorum(nh), all honest validators in set W lock on block B
′.
Let Wactive be the subset of active validators in W . By the end of the last step of the sequence
of events presented above, all validators, except the faulty one that stopped, are locked on a
block. Specifically, validators in V are locked on B and validators in Wactive are locked on B
′.
In the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol honest validators can release the lock only if they receive
Quorum(nh) Commit messages with height, round and block matching the Pre-Prepare message,
while in the IBFT-M1 protocol honest validators never release a lock. Since (i) the union of sets
Wactive and V corresponds to the entire set of all honest and active validators, (ii) both sets
Wactive and V have size < Quorum(n) and (iii) honest validators that are locked on a block only
send messages for this block, then no validator will ever receive Quorum(nh) Commit messages
for the same block and therefore no honest validator will either unlock or create a finalised block.
Case 2: IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol with nh = 6.
Compared to Case 1, we assume that (i) set W also contains the proposer for round 2, p2, (ii)
set V is defined to be a subset of Quorum(nh) − 1 validators with no intersection with set W
and (iii) we define set Z to be the complement of the union of W and V . The three sets are
therefore disjoint sets, and set Z has size ‖Z‖ = nh − (2 · Quorum(nh) + 1) which for nh = 6
corresponds to 1 < Quorum(nh). The immediate consequence of the definition above is that all
validators in V and Z are honest. The sequence of events happening before GST is similar to
the one presented for Case 1 with the addition of events 9 to 14.
1. The proposer for round 0, p0, multicasts a Pre-Prepare message for block B
〈PRE-PREPARE, h, 0, B〉σp0 to all validators (including itself).
2. All validators reply with a Prepare message for block B 〈PREPARE, h, 0, KEC(B)〉.
3. All validators in V receive the Pre-Prepare message for block B and all of the Prepare
messages. Therefore, all validators in V lock on block B.
4. The round-timer expires before any other validator, except for those in set V , receives any
of the Prepare messages. Note that since ‖V ‖ < Quorum(nh) and only validators in V may
send a Commit message for block B, no honest validator will ever produce a finalised block
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including block B due to the Commit messages sent in round 0.
5. All validators send a Round-Change message 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, 1〉 to move to round 1.
6. All validators receive Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages and move to round 1.
7. p1 sends a Pre-Prepare message for block B
′ 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, 1, B′〉σp1 , with B
′ 6= B.
This is possible as p1 is not locked on any block since it is an element of set W which is
disjoint from set V .
8. All validators included in set V are locked on B. Therefore when they receive the Pre-
Prepare message sent by p1 they reply with a Round-Change 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, 2〉 to
move to round 2.
9. All of the validators in sets Z and W respond to the Pre-Prepare for block B′ that they
received with a Prepare message for block B′ and round 1 〈PREPARE, h, 1, KEC(B′)〉.
10. All validators in Z receive the Pre-Prepare message for block B′ and all of the Prepare
messages sent by validators in sets Z and W . Since ‖Z ∪W‖ ≥ ‖W‖ = Quorum(nh), all
validators in Z lock on block B′.
11. The round-timer for round 1 expires before any other validator, except for those in sets V
and Z, receives any of the Prepare messages. Note that since ‖Z‖ < Quorum(nh) and only
validators in Z may send a Commit message for block B′, no honest validator will ever
produce a finalised block including block B′ due to the Commit messages sent in round 1.
12. All validators send a Round-Change message 〈ROUND-CHANGE, h, 2〉 to move to round 2.
13. All validators receive Quorum(nh) Round-Change messages and move to round 2
14. p2 sends a Pre-Prepare message for block B
′′ 〈PRE-PREPARE, h, 2, B′′〉σp2 , with B
′′ 6= B′ 6=
B. This is possible as p2 is not locked on any block since it is an element of set W which is
disjoint from the union of sets V and Z.
15. All validators included in sets V and Z are locked on B and B′, respectively. Therefore
when they receive the Pre-Prepare message sent by p2 they reply with a Round-Change to
move to round 3. All of the validators in set W respond with a Prepare message for block
B′′ and round 2. However, one of these validators is faulty and stops just after sending the
Prepare message and before sending the related Commit message. SetW now contains only
Quorum(nh)− 1 < Quorum(nh) active validators.
16. All honest validators in set W receive all the Prepare messages for block B′′ sent by all
validators in W including the Prepare message sent by the faulty validator before stopping.
Since ‖W‖ = Quorum(nh), all honest validators in set W lock on block B
′′.
Let Wactive be the subset of active validators inW . By the end of the last step of the sequence of
events presented above, all validators, except the faulty one that stopped, are locked on a block.
Specifically, validators in V are locked on B, validators in Z are locked on B′ and validators in
Wactive are locked on B
′′. In the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol honest validators can release
the lock only if they receive Quorum(nh) Commit messages with height, round and block match-
ing the Pre-Prepare message, while in the IBFT-M1 protocol honest validators never release a
lock. Since (i) the union of sets Wactive, V and Z corresponds to the entire set of all honest and
active validators, (ii) all setsWactive, V and Z have size < Quorum(n) and (iii) honest validators
that are locked on a block only send messages for this block, then no validator will ever receive
Quorum(nh) Commit messages for the same block and therefore no honest validator will either
unlock or create a finalised block.
Case 3: IBFT-M1-block-finalisation-protocol with nh ≥ 2.
This case corresponds to Case 1 with Quorum(nh) replaced by Quorumopt(nh). In this case, the
size of V is nh−Quorumopt(nh) which, according to Lemma 25, is < Quorumopt(nh) for nh ≥ 1.
The resulting sequence of events leads the IBFT-M1 protocol to a state where it will be unable
to create any new finalized block even once GST is reached.
Remark For nh = 2 ∨ nh = 3, the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol guarantees pathological weak-
liveness as in this case Quorum(nh) = 1 and therefore each honest validator can create a valid finalised
block without requiring interaction with any other validator.
Theorem 4. When operating in an eventually synchronous network model, neither the IBFT protocol
nor the IBFT-M1 protocol guarantees liveness. This is true even if the only type of node failure
considered is fail-stop.
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Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 23 and 26 and the fact that we are interested only in the cases
where Byzantine-fault-tolerance can be guaranteed, i.e the number of validators is ≥ 4.
7.2 Modification IBFT-M2 protocol: Ensure liveness
In this section we explore two options of how the IBFT and IBFT-M1 protocols can be modified to
guarantee liveness when operating in an eventually synchronous network.
7.2.1 PBFT-like solution
The first option that we present is based on the original PBFT protocol [11]. The key change to IBFT
is to remove the locking mechanism and ensure safety between round changes via a round change
sub-protocol similar to the one in the PBFT protocol. The key modifications can be summarised as
follows:
(S1.M-1) Remove the locking logic.
(S1.M-2) Add a Prepared Certificate to the Round-Change message. A Prepared Certificate includes
a set of Quorumopt(nh) Prepare messages received for the same round of instance h of the
block finalisation protocol. If a validator has received multiple set of Quorumopt(nh) Prepare
messages for different rounds of instance h of the block finalisation protocol, then its Prepared
Certificate only contains the set of Quorumopt(nh) Prepare messages for the highest round
number.
(S1.M-3) Add a New-Round message to be sent by the proposer of the new round once Quorumopt(nh)
valid Round-Change messages for the same new round are received by the proposer.
The content of the New-Round message is similar to the content of the New-View message
of the PBFT protocol, but with the following differences:
(S1.M-3.1) Since IBFT decides on a block at a time, only one Pre-Prepare message is in-
cluded in the New-Round message.
(S1.M-3.2) The Pre-Prepare message included in the New-Round message always contains
a valid block. If the set of Round-Change messages included in the New-Round
message contains at least one valid Prepared Certificate, then the block included
in the Pre-Prepare message must match the block that has a valid Prepared
Certificate with the highest round number. Otherwise, the Pre-Prepare message
can contain any valid block. This is in contrast with PBFT where the Pre-
Prepare messages included in the New-View message may contain null requests.
(S1.M-4) In contrast to PBFT, no checkpoint is required here as the finalisation proof added to each
IBFT block serves as checkpoint.
Modification (S1.M-1) obviously solves the liveness issue, but if introduced in isolation, it would make
the protocol unsafe in the case that a round change occurs. Modification (S1.M-2) and (S1.M-3) ensure
safety without compromising liveness.
A few protocol optimisations are required to this solution to reduce the size of Round-Change and
New-Round messages. One of the potential solutions for reducing the size of the New-Round messages
is replacing the block included in the signed Pre-Prepare messages with a digest of the block and
piggyback the full block to the signed Pre-Prepare, Round-Change and New-Round messages. Other
solutions are available but their discussion is outside the scope of this work.
The correctness proof of this solution is quite extensive and therefore it will be presented as part of a
separate body of work.
7.2.2 Tendermint-like solution
In contrast, the second option looks at implementing some of the concepts from the Tendermint variant
of the PBFT protocol [28]. The availability of this type of solution stems from a private conversation
with Clearmatics. The key idea here is borrowing the relocking mechanism from the Tendermint
protocol [28]. The list of modifications that should be applied to IBFT to implement this solution are
summarised below:
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(S2.M-1) Add the locked round value to the Pre-Prepare message. The locked round value corresponds
to the latest round number where a validator locked on the locked block.
(S2.M-2) Allow relocking if a validator receives Quorumopt(n) Prepare messages for round r and one
Pre-Prepare message with locked round equal to r provided that r is higher than the current
round.
7.2.3 Comparison between the two solutions
The two proposed solutions differ in behaviour and performance only when either the proposer is
Byzantine or the network delay is longer than the duration of the round timer for round 0. If the
proposer for round 0 is honest and all messages are delivered within the duration of the round timer
for round 0, then the two solutions behave identically from a practical perspective. Performance wise,
the main differences between the two solutions can be summarised as follows:
• The PBFT-like solution ensures that after GST, if the proposer of the current round is honest,
then every honest node decides within that round. In contrast, the Tendermint-like solution
may require nh − 1 round changes before an honest validator reaches a decision where nh is the
number of validators for the generic h-th instance of the IBFT-block-finalisation-protocol;
• The PBFT-like solution can be extended to achieve block finalisation in two communication
phases only (Pre-Prepare and Prepare) in the optimal case that no Byzantine validators are
present and the network delay is longer than the duration of the round timer for round 0. This
can be achieved by adapting the protocol for very fast learning presented by Dutta et al [29] to
work within the definition of the IBFT protocol;
• The Tendermint-like solution requires lower overall bandwidth than the PBFT-like solution when
the protocol moves to a new round.
8 Conclusions and Further Work
To our knowledge, this work represents the first analysis of the robustness of the IBFT consensus
protocol. Our work analysed the persistence and liveness properties of the protocol, and discovered
issues in both.
Persistence guarantees blockchain consistency and immutability amongst all honest nodes. Specifically,
persistence ensures that if an honest node adds transaction T in position i of its local transaction ledger,
then (i) T is the only transaction that can ever be added in position i by any other honest node, (ii)
T will eventually be added to the local transaction ledger of any other honest node. We showed that
the IBFT protocol does not guarantee persistence under an eventually synchronous network model.
Liveness ensures that a transaction sent to all honest validators will eventually be included in the
blockchain. We showed that the IBFT protocol does not guarantee liveness under an eventually
synchronous network model even if the only failure mode considered is fail-stop.
We briefly proposed five modifications to the IBFT protocol so that persistence is ensured when
operating in eventually synchronous networks. We also proposed two possible ways to modify the
IBFT protocol to ensure liveness when operating in eventually synchronous networks: modification of
IBFT based on lessons from the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus protocol, or
modification based on lessons from the Tendermint consensus protocol. Such proposals would need to
be both fully developed and formally analysed to be properly assessed.
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A Proofs for Section 5
Lemma 2. A transaction T cannot appear in two different positions of the local blockchain of an
honest node.
Proof. An honest node, before adding a finalised block to its local blockchain, checks the block included
in the finalised block for validity (line 5 in Algorithm 1). As detailed in Section 3, block validity, as
far as transactions are concerned, is verified as specified in the Ethereum Yellow Paper [2]. Equation
(58) of the Ethereum Yellow Paper mandates that a transaction is valid only if the transaction nonce
matches the expected nonce of the transaction sender [2]. Equation (61) of the Ethereum Yellow Paper
states that the expected nonce of the transaction sender is incremented when a transaction is executed
[2]. Thus, the same transaction T cannot be included more than once in the same block and cannot
be included in two different blocks of the same chain.
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Lemma 8. n− 1 ≥ Quorum(n) for any n ≥ 4.
Proof. The Lemma is proved by the following chain of inequalities and equalities:
Quorum(n) ≡ 2 ·
⌊
n− 1
3
⌋
+ 1 (6)
≤ 2 ·
n− 1
3
+ 1
=
2n+ 1
3
It is easy to prove that 2n+13 ≤ n− 1 for any n ≥ 4.
Lemma 11. ∀n ≥ 1 : n > 2 · f(n)
Proof.
2 · f(n) ≡ 2
⌊
n− 1
3
⌋
(7)
≤ 2
n− 1
3
=
2n
3
−
2
3
It is easy to see the 2n3 −
2
3 < n for any n ≥ 1.
B Proofs for Section 6.1
Lemma 16. For any nh ≥ 1, provided that the number of Byzantine validators is ≤ f(nh), the
intersection of any two sets of Quorumopt(nh) validators is guaranteed to include an honest validator.
Proof. Let us assume that V and W are any two sets of validators of size Quorumopt(nh). Let H
denote the set of honest validators included in the intersection of V and W . The minimum size of H
is expressed by the following equation:
min(‖H‖) = max
(
2 ·Quorumopt(nh)− nh − f(nh), 0
)
(8)
The following chain of equalities and inequalities proves that min(‖H‖) ≥ 13 :
min(‖H‖) = 2 ·Quorumopt(nh)− nh − f(nh) (9)
= 2
⌈
2nh
3
⌉
−
⌊
nh − 1
3
⌋
− n
≥ 2 ·
2nh
3
−
nh − 1
3
− nh
=
1
3
Since min(‖H‖) is an integer value, the inequality min(‖H‖) ≥ 13 implies that min(‖H‖) ≥ 1.
C Proofs for Section 6.2
Lemma 21. ∀n > 0 : Quorumopt(n) + f(n) ≤ n
Proof. The following chain of equalities and inequalities proves that Quorumopt(n) + f(n) ≤ n+
1
3 :
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Quorumopt(n) + f(n) =
⌈
2n
3
⌉
+
⌊
n− 1
3
⌋
(10)
=
⌊
2n− 1
3
⌋
+ 1 +
⌊
n− 1
3
⌋
≤
2n− 1
3
+ 1 +
n− 1
3
= n+
1
3
Since Quorumopt(n) + f(n) is an integer value, the inequality Quorumopt(n) + f(n) ≤ n+
1
3 implies
that Quorumopt(n) + f(n) ≤ n.
D Proofs for Section 7.1
Lemma 24. ∀n ≥ 4 ∧ n 6= 6 : n−Quorum(n) < Quorum(n)
Proof. It is easy to see that the following inequality implies the Lemma:
2 ·Quorum(n) > n, if n ≥ 4 ∧ n 6= 6
We now prove the Lemma by showing that (a) 2 ·Quorum(n) ≥ 4 · n3 − 2 and (b) 4 ·
n
3 − 2 > n when
n ≥ 4 ∧ n 6= 6.
The following chain of equalities and inequalities proves (a).
2 ·Quorum(n) = 4 · f(n) + 2 (11)
= 4
(⌈n
3
⌉
− 1
)
+ 2
= 4
⌈n
3
⌉
− 2
≥ 4 ·
n
3
− 2
It is easy prove that 4 · n3 − 2 > n when n > 6. Therefore the Lemma is proved for n > 6.
For n = 4 or n = 5, we have 2 ·Quorum(n) = 6 > n. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 25. ∀n > 0 : n−Quorumopt(n) < Quorumopt(n)
Proof. It is easy to see that the following inequality implies the Lemma:
2 ·Quorumopt(n) > n
The Lemma is proved by the following sequence of inequalities and equalities:
2 ·Quorumopt(n) = 2 ·
⌈
2n
3
⌉
(12)
≥ 2 ·
2n
3
=
4n
3
> n
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